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Banking and Deposit Insurance:
An Unfinished Agenda for the 1990s t
SARAH JANE HUGHES*
"In the first 100 days of the new administration, banks and S&Ls will fail
at.the rate of more than one a day "'
The United States banking industry is at a turning point. On December 20,
1991, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act of 1991 (FDICIA or Act).2 One year later, beginning on December
19, 1992, bank regulators and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC or Corporation) were forced either to close large numbers of critically
undercapitalized banks and thrifts or to justify why they should not close
these institutions. A new round of closures would place considerable new
burdens on the already stressed federal deposit insurance system.
Enactment of the FDICIA followed an extensive debate about the future
scope of banking activities and the likely insolvency in 1992 of the Bank
Insurance Fund, as more banks and thrifts experienced losses in loan
portfolios and eventually exhausted their capital. Instead of the broad reforms
sought by the Treasury Department and banking industry, the FDICIA focused
on protection of deposit insurance funds. Its provisions, which become
effective over the next several years,3 are likely to yield a very different
t © Copyright 1993 by Sarah Jane Hughes. All rights reserved.
* Adjunct Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; A.B., Mount
Holyoke College, 1971; J.D., University of Washington, 1974. I wish to thank my colleague, Aviva
Orenstem, for her comments, and my research assistants, Michael L. Fuelling, Class of 1992, and Jamey
L. Kurtzer, Class of 1994, for their diligence and support. Due to the space limitations of this
Sesquicentennial Issue, this Essay does not discuss all of the important issues of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) nor all of the policy issues, such as
overbreadth, that relate to the federal deposit insurance system.
I. Jerry Knight & Susan Schmidt, The Unmentioned Monster: Bush, Clinton Reluctant to Discuss
Coming Wave of Bank Thrift Failures, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1992, at HI.
2. The FDICIA was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236. The complete text of the bill is repnnted
at Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) No. 1413, Part II, at 255-530 (October 24, 1991). The FDICIA amends the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (FDIA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1834(b) (1988).
3. See, e.g., FDICIA § 302(g), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (Supp. III 1991) (regarding date for nsk-based
assessments: earlier of 180 days after final regulations become effective or January 1, 1994); FDICIA
§ I 1 (b), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d) (Supp. III 1991) (regarding deadline for annual on-site examinations of
insured depository institutions: December 19, 1992); FDICIA § 133(g), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5) (Supp.
III 1991) (concerning conservatorship and receivership amendments to facilitate prompt corrective
action: December 19, 1992).
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banking industry than the United States has today For example, in addition
to its potential for increasing the number of bank failures, the Act will result
in additional consolidation of banking resources across the country The
FDICIA also will change the focus of investments in and by banks because
it increases the strategic advantages of major banks over their smaller
competitors.
The FDICIA not only reflects the dominance of deposit insurance in federal
banking regulation, but also Congress's inability to enact structural banking
reforms that would increase opportunities for banks to compete profitably with
other financial service providers.4 To the extent Congress failed to include
structural banking reforms in the FDICIA, it merely postponed action
necessary for the future health of the banking industry and, ultimately, for the
integrity of the deposit insurance funds.
For the purposes of this Essay, I initially assess the principal aims of the
FDICIA. Next, I analyze three provisions of the FDICIA that demonstrate
continuing problems in the federal deposit insurance system: (1) the "least
possible cost" resolution requirements, including restrictions on payments to
uninsured and foreign depositors; (2) the "prompt corrective action" standards;
and (3) the call for enhanced insurance assessments. Finally, I conclude that
the FDICIA will fail to achieve recapitalization of the Bank Insurance Fund
and, accordingly, that further funding for the deposit insurance system will be
required in the near term. In addition, the Act's shortcomings highlight the
need for a new round of banking reforms.5
I. THE FDICIA
Deposit insurance has been among the most powerful factors in our bank
regulatory system since the Depression-era banking reforms.6 Policy makers
have cited risks to the deposit insurance system to justify enhancing the
enforcement powers of federal regulators as well as the increasing frequency
and scope of bank examinations, with the exception of bank and thrift
4. See Jonathan Rauch, Demosclerosis, 24 NAT'L J. 1998, 2000 (1992). These reforms include the
much-debated nationwide branching, insurance, and underwriting activities for insured banks.
5. See 27 House Banking Members Urge Gonzalez to Bring Bank Relief Bills Up This Year, BNA
BANKING DAILY, Sept. 25, 1992, at 13-15 (describing Sept. 22, 1992, letter to Committee Chair, Henry
B. Gonzalez, requesting hearings on additional banking reforms, including reduction of the FDICIA's
compliance burdens).
6. See generally HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED xvi-xvii, 148-50 (1991);
Michael Klausner, An Economic Analysis of Bank Regulatory Reform: The Financial Institutions Safety
and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 705-09 (1991) (noting that deposit insurance
is third pillar of regulatory scheme; others are restrictions on entry and geographic expansion); IRVINE
H. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF BANK FAILURES AND REscuEs (1986).
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deregulation in the early 1980s.7 Commentators generally agree that
deregulation in conjunction with severe regional recessions, questionable
internal management practices, and flawed supervision by federal regulatory
agencies 8 led both to the massive thrift and bank failures of the late 1980s9
and to the current profitability problems of and capital burdens on the banking
system.'0 To reduce the stresses on the deposit insurance system following
the thrift crisis, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)." Its major foci were recapitaliza-
tion of the thrift insurance fund and enhanced supervisory powers for federal
regulators and the FDIC. 2
A. Principal Aims of the FDICIA
The FDICIA's principal aims were to recapitalize the Bank Insurance
Fund, 3 to protect the integrity of the deposit insurance funds, 4 and to
7. See Depositary Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), Pub.
L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132; Gain-St. Germain Depositary Institutions Act of 1982 (Gain-St. Germain),
Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469. Through these two deregulatory measures, Congress expanded
deposit insurance coverage to $100,000 per account, granted considerable "new" powers to thrifts and
banks, and deregulated the interest rates offered by insured institutions.
8. See generally PAUL Z. PILZER, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1989). See also SPRAGUE, supra note
6, at 233 (citing severe economic conditions and poor management as factors in bank failures).
9. The FDIC reported more than 1,000 failures during the 1980s. See Paul H. Irving & T. Hale
Boggs, Financial Institution Directors: Mitigating Risks of Liability in Shareholder Actions, 109
BANKING L.J 336, 336 n.l (1992).
10. E.g., Alfred J.T. Byrne & Martha L. Coulter, Safety and Soundness in Banking Reform:
Implications for the Federal Deposit Insurer, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 679, 680 n.3 (1991) ("[DIDMCA and
Gain-St. Germain] did not provide adequate safeguards, such as increased supervisory powers, to protect
against excessive safety-and-soundness risk. On balance, the new powers adversely affected the financial
health of the savings and loan industry, as well as the federal deposit insurance fund that covered
savings and loans at the time."). The current stresses are evident, for example, in the fact that the Bank
Insurance Fund would have become insolvent if Congress had not raised its borrowing authority in the
FDICIA. Stephen K. Huber, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of.1991, 109
BANKING L.. 300, 301 (1992); see also John L. Douglas, Deposit Insurance Reform, 27 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. I 1 (1992); David Greising & Geoffrey Smith, Banks Get RealAbout Real Estate Losses, BUS.
WK., Oct. 5, 1992, at 116.
11. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). For a thorough analysis of FIRREA's
provisions, see BLOCH & WILLIAMS, A PRACrICAL GUIDE TO FIRREA (1990).
12. FIRREA §§ 511, 512, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1441(b) (Supp. II 1990).
13. See FDICIA § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a) (Supp. III 1991) (extending from $5 billion to $30
billion the FDIC's borrowing authority to finance deposit insurance payments); see also FDICIA
§ 302(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1991) (encouraging FDIC to impose higher and risk-
based deposit insurance assessments).
14. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, RTC Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement Act of 1991,
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1420 (Dec. 6, 1991) (Conference Report on S. 543 [FDICIA]).
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protect the taxpayer from further bailouts of those funds.I" Consistent with
these goals, the FDICIA directs the FDIC to close critically undercapitalized
banks whose capital fails the Act's two percent tangible equity test 6 and to
liquidate failed banks unless another resolution method is "less costly 17 In
addition, the Act enhanced the FDIC's supervisory powers, including authority
to conduct additional examinations and impose stricter accounting stan-
dards. "
The FDICIA also includes provisions to implement its three central policies.
For example,'it limits the FDIC's ability to pay certain classes of creditors of
failed institutions, including holders of uninsured domestic
9 and foreign20
deposits, and creditors (for example, debtholders and shareholders) other than
depositors.2 '
The FDICIA, however, does not include any of the structural reforms of the
banking industry that Congress had considered.22 These reforms include the
15. For more discussion of the provisions of the FDICIA and its compamon, the RTC Refinancing,
Restructuring, and Improvement Act of 1991, see Huber, supra note 10; Federal Banking Insurance
Reform: FDIC and RTC Improvement Acts of 1991, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1425 (Jan. 10,
1992) [hereinafter Federal Banking Insurance Reform]; FDIC IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991 AND RTC
REFINANCING, RESTRUCTURING, AND IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991 (1992).
16. FDICIA § 141, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(B) (Supp. III 1991). The goal of this provision is to
reduce deposit insurance losses by closing a failing bank before it has a zero-capital position, on the
ground that these banks' assets deteriorate after FDIC action. See Jonathan R. Macey, Needless
Nationalization at the FDIC, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1992, at A10 (criticizing delays in declaring bank
insolvencies, particularly in 1992 case of failed New York thrift, CrossLand FSB).
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4).
18. FDICIA §§I l(a), 112(a), 121(a), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1820(d), 1831(m), 1831(n) (Supp. III 1991);
see also Douglas, supra note 10, at 28; Dean Foust, The Bank Police Get a Bigger Stick, Bus. WK.,
Aug. 31, 1992, at 59.
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E) (provision effective after December 31, 1994, or sooner as the
corporation may determine); see also Federal Banking Insurance Reform, supra note 15, 91118.
20. FDICIA § 312, FDIA § 41, 12 U.S.C. § 1831(r) (Supp. III 1991); see infra text accompanying
notes 63, 73.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E). Payments to shareholders and creditors other than depositors was
one of the most controversial features in the bailout of Continental Bank of Illinois in 1984. See
SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 189, 191; see also Douglas, supra note 10, at 21-22.
22. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991) [hereinafter MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM]. The
Administration's proposal-the Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991
(FISCCA)-called for nationwide banking, new or expanded financial activities for banks (particularly
in securities underwriting and insurance), and commercial ownership of banking organizations. In
addition, it recommended reducing deposit insurance coverage, both to redtuce risks that banks may take
and to channel deposits to sounder banks. S. 713, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); H.R. 1505, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991). These are reproduced at Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1383, Part 11 (1991). For
analysis of the FISCCA proposals, see Klausner, supra note 6. See generally Robert M. Garsson, Rescue
of Insurance Fund Approved by House Panel, AM. BANKER, Nov. 20, 1991, at 1; George Graham,
Thwarted Ambitions, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1991, at 20; George Graham, Congress Near Decision on
Bank Reform, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1991, at 6; George Graham, Compromise Angers Bank Reform
Lobby, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at 6.
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creation of a nationwide banking system and the repeal of statutes, such as the
Banking Act of 1933,23 the McFadden Act,24 and the Douglas Amend-
ment,25 that limit the ability of banks and bank holding companies to
compete with nationwide, non-bank financial service providers.
B. The "Least Possible Cost" Resolution Requirements
Although prior law required the FDIC to select the least costly resolution
method, it permitted the FDIC to employ any method of resolution requiring
fewer Corporation funds than liquidation would require, even if alternative
measures less costly than the chosen method may have been available.26 The
FDIC, however, could avoid the "least costly" requirement if the Corporation
deemed, as it often did,27 the failed institution either "essential to the
community"" or "essential to the financial system. '29 Also, regardless of
its mandate to fashion the least costly resolution, for many years the FDIC
structured the majority of resolutions so that it protected uninsured as well as
insured deposits.3" In many of these resolutions, this practice increased the
cost to deposit insurance funds above the amount that would have been
expended if the FDIC had employed the least expensive method.3 Commen-
tators agreed that meaningful reform of the deposit insurance system required
ending the FDIC's former pattern of protecting uninsured deposits32 and
instead imposing market discipline on banks and depositors. 33
23. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.) The provisions separating "banking" from "commerce" commonly referred to as the Glass-
Steagall Act.
24. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988). In 1982, Garn-St. Germain amended the Douglas Amendment to
permit emergency acquisitions involving failed or failing banks. Gain-St. Germain § 188(c) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f) (1988)) (concerning FDIC's emergency acquisitions procedures).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1988).
27. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A).
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(I)(C) (Supp. 11989).
30. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: The Origins and Future
of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769, 783-84 (1991); Klausner, supra note 6, at 706-08, 731;
see also Henry B. Gonzalez, Toward Deposit Insurance Reform, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 665, 668 (1991).
31. E.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 788; Knight & Schmidt, supra note 1, at H4 (estimating
costs of guaranteeing all deposits at $40 billion). By arranging for coverage of uninsured deposits, the
FDIC diluted the proportion of the failed institution's assets to insured deposits and, correspondingly,
decreased its likely share of the proceeds of those assets and increased the size of its contribution to the
resolution costs. Coverage of uninsured deposits exaggerated immediate losses to the insurance funds
because the failed institutions had not paid for coverage.
32. E.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 783-90.
33. E.g., id. at 786; Klausner, supra note 6, at 709-16.
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The FDICIA contains a number of provisions designed to restrict the
FDIC's discretion in choosing the least costly method. These include (1) a
requirement that the FDIC select the resolution method that is the "least
costly" of all possible methods, 4 (2) a new, restrictive definition of
"liquidation costs,"" (3) specification of the time at which the FDIC must
determine the "least possible cost" method of resolution,3 6 (4) a prohibition
on using deposit insurance funds to pay uninsured domestic or foreign
deposits" or claims of nondeposit creditors, 3' and (5) a narrower "systemic
risk" exception to the least cost requirement than prior law provided.
1. Systemic Risk
In order to encourage more liquidations of failed institutions, the FDICIA
provides a narrower "systemic risk" exception to the least cost requirement.
It only permits the FDIC to provide extraordinary assistance to financial
institutions whose liquidation the Secretary of the Treasury (in consultation
with the President), together with the Board of Directors of the FDIC and the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines would have
"serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability" that
more comprehensive FDIC coverage would avert or mitigate.39 In addition,
Congress required the FDIC to recapture the excess costs of these bailouts by
a special assessment on other members of the affected insurance fund (for
example, the Bank Insurance Fund or the Savings Association Insurance
Fund).40 The FDICIA also directs the General Accounting Office to audit the
FDIC's decision and its plan to recapture the funds.4' Thus, the FDICIA did
not end the FDIC's authority to rescue a major institution from failure if its
failure would have especially significant implications for the health of the
34. FDICIA § 141(a)(4)(A)(ii), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. III 1991).
35. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(D).
36. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(C).
37. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(i)(I).
38. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(i)(II) (prohibiting payments to "creditors other than depositors"); FDICIA
§ 311(a)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(8) (Supp. III 1991) (excluding certain investment contracts and
brokered deposits from definition of "insured deposits").
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G); see id. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) (regarding approval requirements). See
generally PAUL EINZIG, THE EURO-DOLLAR SYSTEM 66 (4th ed. 1970) (relating origins of systemic risk
principle to Creditanstalt crisis in 1931).
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii). The special assessment, assuming that the FDIC levies one, will
complicate planning by banks or thrifts participating in the insurance funds because these banks and
thrifts can neither predict the timing nor control the size of assessments.
41. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(iv) (regarding annual GAO compliance audit).
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banking system.42 Rather, it imposed political and financial constraints on
its exercise of this exception.
Banking experts disagree about the likely effect of these new requirements
on resolutions. They cite four factors that complicate the ability of Congress
or the industry to evaluate the basis for the FDIC's "least costly" determina-
tion. First, regulators historically have preferred "almost any bid" to the
process of closing and liquidating banks.4 3 Second, the FDIC does not
publicize the nature of the bids it receives for failed institutions or the cost
comparisons on which it makes its determinations." Third, the FDIC often
assumes portfolios of nonperforming loans from failed institutions or
otherwise guarantees a fixed yield on the purchaser's investment; these actions
present difficult-to-measure contingent liabilities to deposit insurance
funds.45 Fourth, the FDIC has granted tax concessions to purchasers of failed
institutions, which increase the overall government cost of the resolution
without observable effects on deposit insurance expenditures." Because the
FDICIA does not require the FDIC to change any of these practices, it is
unclear how the Act will result in lower expenditures for the resolution of
failed institutions.
Banking experts disagree about the strictness of the "systemic risk"
provision. At least one commentator believes that the systemic risk standards
are so strict that the FDIC will use this authority only in rare cases.4 7
However, the FDIC has used its authority in the past to rescue institutions that
42. See GARTEN, supra note 6, at 16-20 (outlining factors favoring the rescue of some banks from
liquidation); see also SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 248-52 (noting that the FDIC considered Continental
Illinois' role as a correspondent bank for hundreds of other financial institutions and as a major
commercial lender in deciding to rescue and recapitalize that bank with federal funds).
43. See Neil Barsky & Kenneth H. Bacon, FDIC Rejects Two Bids for CrossLand, Puts Up $1.2
Billion of Its Own Capital, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1992, at AS (citing former FDIC Chairman William
Issac's view).
44. See Kenneth H. Bacon & Steven Lipm, Under New Bank Law, More Large Depositors Face
Losses in Failures, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1992, at AI; see also Macey, supra note 16. For a report
critical of the FDIC's post-FDICIA procedures for making the "least possible cost" determination, see
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FAILED BANK-FDIC DOCUMENTATION OF CRossLAND SAVINGS, FSB,
DECISION WAS INADEQUATE, REPORT GAO/GGD-92-92 (July 7, 1992).
45. E.g., Macey, supra note 16; Barbara A. Rehm, FDIC Plans to Guarantee New Loans in
Northeast, AM. BANKER, Feb. 6, 1992, at 1, 10 (stating that Fleet/Norstar purchase of failed Bank of
New England left $6 billion in bad assets with FDIC; value of assets declines as collection proceeds).
46. E.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 790 (noting that the FDIC substantially discounts assets
to induce purchases and grants purchasers yield-maintenance guarantees and buy-back options);
Christopher Georges, Egads! The S&L Scandal Lives!, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 18, 20
(describing $600 million tax benefit as part of a $5 billion federal guarantee to Revlon Chairman, Ron
Perleman, in acquisition of First Gibraltar Savings under so-called "Southwest Plan").
47. Huber, supra note 10, at 303. Indeed, the FDIC characterized the CrossLand conservatorship
as, if anything, a "least possible cost" resolution. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 44.
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few would have considered "essential" to the community or the financial
system.48 Some experts point to this past use as evidence that the FDIC will
use its own discretion to overlook or manipulate statutory constraints.49
Some commentators believe the "systemic risk" provision leaves too much
discretion with bank regulators to favor larger banks over smaller banks.5"
They argue that the prospect of full coverage of uninsured deposits will cause
many depositors to shift to larger banks because of the added "safety net"
larger banks can provide. Also, the "systemic risk" exception encourages
bigger banks to follow business plans that increase their access to nationwide
markets, but also increase the risks that their activities may pose to the
deposit insurance funds. For example, banks legally may increase their
nationwide activities in a variety of ways, including (1) acquisitions through
regional banking compacts, (2) various nonbranch expansion devices, such as
loan production offices and credit cards, and (3) takeovers of failed institu-
tions in other regions.5 Bank analysts predict that, by increasing their
respective size and by engaging in nationwide operations, banks may reduce
the price they pay for deposits, particularly for uninsured deposits, 5 2 because
depositors will factor into the yields they otherwise would receive the deposit
insurance subsidy they are likely to receive under the systemic risk provi-
sion.5
3
In addition to the obvious strategic advantages held by larger banks, experts
recognize that regulators routinely face political pressures not to declare bank
48. See FDICIA § 141, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A), 1823(c)(I)(C) (Supp. III 1991); SPRAGUE, SUpra
note 6, at 35-38.
49. Gonzalez, supra note 30, at 668 (arguing that FDIC misused essentiality authority and citing
insistence of former FDIC Director William Seidman that FDIC acted properly); see also Macey &
Miller, supra note 30, at 788; SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 272.
50. Michael Quint, U.S. Shift on Deposit Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1992, at DI; see also
Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 788 (concluding that provisions of FISCCA comparable to FDICIA
left too much discretion to the FDIC and predicting "a massive disparity in regulatory treatment between
big banks and smaller banks, with uninsured depositors in small and medium-sized banks facing a
realistic prospect of losing money in the event of a bank failure, and depositors in larger banks enjoying
complete protection").
51. These developments were well underway at the time of the FDIC's 1984 bailout of Continental
Illinois National Bank. Former director Sprague warns that they would create additional banking
networks that would be considered too big to fail. SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 240-41.
52. See Norbert McCrady, EndFDIC TiltAgainst Community Banks, AM. BANKER, Mar. 19, 1992,
at 4; see also Joseph P Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, A Quality and Risk-Adjusted Cost Function for
Banks: Evidence on the "Too-Big-To-Fail" Doctrine, Working Paper No. 91-21, Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, Nov. 1991; Macey, supra note 16; Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 787; see supra
text accompanying note 30.
53. See Hughes & Mester, supra note 52, at 16; cf Chrsti Harlan, U.S. Takes over at Texas First
City Bancorp., WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1992, at A3, A8 (noting that the FDIC guaranteed only 80% of
deposits exceeding the $100,000 insured limit in the four largest banks of First City Bancorporation).
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insolvencies and not to liquidate financial institutions.54 These pressures
mount during election years,55 increasing the likelihood that the FDIC will
use the systemic risk exception to bailout major institutions56 and perhaps
some that are not so major.57
For these reasons, commentators believe that the FDIC, by sustaining larger
institutions, will experience losses not contemplated by the FDICIA. 5s These
large bank resolutions also will increase the potential shortfalls in insurance
funds in the near future.5 9
2. Exclusions of Certain Deposits from Coverage
a. Uninsured Domestic Deposits and Non-Deposit Creditors
One of the chief criticisms of recent bank resolutions has been the FDIC's
tendency to cover all deposits of failed institutions, including those portions
over the $100,000 limit for insured deposits. The FDICIA prohibits the FDIC
from continuing to pay uninsured depositors after December 31, 1994, or
earlier if the FDIC considers it appropriate.6 °
54. See Macey, supra note 16; Klausner, supra note 6, at 739.
55. Macey, supra note 16.
56. See Klausner, supra note 6, at 739 (giving a prime example of the magnitude of forces
employed when a major employer is faced with extinction-the government's bailout of Chrysler
Corporation).
57. For example, the FDIC took over CrossLand FSB in late January, 1992, its first resolution
following enactment of the FDICIA and its first "bailout." CrossLand, located in Brooklyn, New York,
was the second largest thrift in the Northeast. The FDIC rejected bids from two bank holding companies
and created a new bank under its management that it expects to sell when economic conditions in the
metropolitan New York City area rebound. In addition, by reorganizing the thrift under its management,
the FDIC protected a substantial number of uninsured blue-collar depositors in the New York
metropolitan area as well as a sizeable volume of underperforming real estate loans. The FDIC justified
its overall strategy on the ground that operating CrossLand was the "least possible cost" method
available to the FDIC, although commentators question whether it will prove to be so. For criticism of
the CrossLand rescue, see Macey, supra note 16; see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note
44; CrossLand Deal Spillover: FDIC's Credibility Affected; Impact on Future Bidding Feared, THE
FDIC WATCH, Feb. 24, 1992, at I [hereinafter CrossLand Deal Spillover]; Former FDIC Ojficials Join
the Chorus of Criticism of Agency's CrossLand Takeover, THE FDIC WATCH, Mar. 23, 1992, at 3
[hereinafter CrossLand Takeover]; Barbara A. Rehm, Crossland Sets Tone for Future FDIC Takeovers,
AM. BANKER, Jan. 29, 1992, at 1; Tim Smart et al., Perfect Timing for Sick Banks, Bus. WK., Mar. 23,
1992, at 29. CrossLand remains under federal management more than one year after its takeover by the
FDIC, although the FDIC has begun to market it. CrossLand Sale Effort Set, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993,
at D4; Phil Roosevelt, Crossland Has Big Plans for Servicing Portfolio, AM. BANKER, Feb. 5, 1993,
at 10 (reporting sale of CrossLand Mortgage Corp. to private investors).
58. E.g., Macey, supra note 16; Rehm, supra note 57, at I; CrossLand Deal Spillover, supra note
57, at i; Smart et al., supra note 57, at 29; CrossLand Takeover, supra note 57, at 3.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 92-118.
60. FDICIA § 141, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E) (Supp. III 1991).
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The FDIC has begun to implement this provision, with some uninsured
depositors "taking haircuts"-as the industry describes full or partial losses
on uninsured deposits-when their banks failed.6 Based on the FDIC's
actions since the FDICIA, it appears that the size of the failed institution
determines whether uninsured depositors will suffer losses, so that depositors
of larger institutions are less likely to suffer losses even where the FDIC does
not claim to invoke the "systemic risk" provision.62
b. Foreign Deposits
In addition to prohibiting the FDIC from paying uninsured depositors, the
FDICIA expressly excludes "foreign deposits" from deposit insurance
coverage. 63 Foreign deposits, 64 generally handled by major banks, 6' earn
above-market interest rates in part because they are not subject to deposit
insurance assessments." The conventional wisdom was that depositors of
these large sums were less interested in deposit insurance coverage than in the
higher yields generally paid on these deposits. 67 In fact, because the FDIC
61. Quint, supra note 50 (discussing the FDIC's projection, by Harrison Young, that 50% of the
anticipated failures in 1992 would result in losses to uninsured depositors, and noting that in 9 of the
21 actual bank closures in early 1992, depositors had suffered losses as opposed to losses in 21 cases
in all of 1991).
62. Compare Macey, supra note 16 (criticizing the FDIC's protection of all depositors in the
January, 1992, bailout of giant CrossLand FSB on the "least possible cost" basis) with Quint, supra note
50 (noting that depositors of Broadway Bank and Trust Company of Patterson, New Jersey, lost $6.3
million in uninsured deposits). But see John Rather, Bank Failures Catch Depositors Off Guard, N.Y.
TiMEs, June 28, 1992, § 13 (Long Island), at I (discussing the FDIC's covering of 75% of uninsured
deposits at American Savings Bank in the New York City metropolitan area ($3.2 billion bank) while
not covering all uninsured deposits in the 1990 closing of Freedom National Bank in Harlem ($120.5
million bank) or the 1991 closing of Commerce National Bank of Staten Island ($404.6 million bank)).
63. FDICIA § 312, 12 U.S.C. § 183 1(r) (Supp. III 1991). For the full text, see Federal Banking
Insurance Reform, supra note 15, at 2212.
64. Widespread use of foreign deposits, which are deposits denominated in a currency other than
that of the country in which they are deposited, is one of the bigger structural changes in international
banking of the last 35 years. See EINZIG, supra note 39, at xiv, 1. Accordingly, "Eurodollars" are dollar-
denominated deposits held by banks outside the United States.
65. Huber, supra note 10, at 309.
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(5) (1988). See generally Henry S. Terrell & Rodney H. Mills, Jr.,
International Banking Facilities and the Eurodollar Market, in EURODOLLARS AND INTERNATIONAL
BANKING 183, 199 (Paolo Savona & George Sutija eds., 1985).
67. Huber, supra note 10, at 309.
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frequently has protected these depositors,65 they could expect to have both
higher yields and de facto deposit insurance coverage.69
Bank regulators and experts have argued for the imposition of deposit
insurance premiums on foreign deposits as one means of reducing the risks
they represent to the health of the system.7' However, large banks with
foreign deposits and foreign depositors prefer the present, no-assessment
arrangement, perhaps counting on the FDIC's history of paying their deposits
in the event of bank failure-the perfect free-rider arrangement. Because
major U.S. banks have had foreign deposits as large as their domestic deposit
bases, 7' bank experts consider these foreign deposits as representing
substantial off-balance-sheet risks for the deposit insurance fund.72
Despite the FDICIA's express exclusion of foreign deposits from FDIC
coverage, the FDIC's past behavior vis-A-vis foreign deposits and the systemic
risk provision in the FDICIA still may tempt the FDIC to cover foreign
deposits in the future. To the extent that banks' deposit insurance assessments
do not include the foreign-deposit bases that major banks maintain, these
deposits represent potential future drains on deposit insurance funds.73
68. E.g., id., SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 249-51 (recognizing that the FDIC's bailout of Continental
covered $30 billion in foreign deposits); see also Anacostia's Banking Reprieve, WASH. POST, Apr. 16,
1991, at A18 (protecting $37 million in uninsured foreign deposits through 1990 sale of National Bank
of Washington to Riggs Bank, which bought balance of deposits from the FDIC).
69. Anacostia's Banking Reprieve, supra note 68. Others have criticized this policy. E.g., Macey
& Miller, supra note 30, at 787 (criticizing de facto insurance for all deposits).
70. SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 249; see also Core Banks Proposal: Heanng before the Committee
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1991)
[hereinafter Core Banks] (comment of Wells Fargo Bank representative).
71. See SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 250. Continental paid $6.5 million in insurance premiums in
1983. That sum purchased FDIC coverage for $69 billion of Continental's liabilities, including $30
billion in foreign deposits as well as $36 billion in uninsured foreign loans. Id. Criticisms of the free
ride that the FDIC has granted to foreign deposits were common pnor to the enactment of the FDICIA.
E.g., Core Banks, supra note 70, at 190.
72. See SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 251 (table 14.1) (showing that in 1984, the 10 leading banks in
foreign deposits held $222 billion in foreign deposits and $226 billion in domestic deposits).
73. A separate question is whether foreign depositors will be willing to rely on coverage in the
event of bank failure. Greater risks perceived by depositors may dampen the interest of those depositors
to place their funds with U.S. banks. This prospect may be exacerbated whenever interest rates in the
U.S. are lower than those offered by our principal trading partners, such as Germany. E.g., Peter Truell,
European System Braces for French Vote; Major Nations to Urge German Rate Cut: Most G-7 Finance
Chiefs See Growth Tied to Easing Credit, Calming Market, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1992, at A2 (noting
that high German interest rates, coupled with rapid integration of the EC's currencies and economies
caused turmoil in currency markets); Floyd Norris, Currency Wars: Central Banks May Yet Prevail,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1992, § 3, at 1.
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C. Prompt Corrective Action for
Critically Undercapitalized Institutions
Perhaps the most significant changes made by the FDICIA are in section
131. Prior law authorized appointment of a receiver or conservator under a
variety of circumstances, such as when an institution became insolvent 4 or
violated a final cease-and-desist order of its supervisory agency " Critics of
past resolutions argued that delays in closing failing institutions added
significantly to resolution costs.
76
The goal of section 131 is to restrict the losses that undercapitalized
depository institutions may impose on deposit insurance funds by requiring
prompt corrective action on the part of the supervisory agency and the
FDIC.77 To reduce the expenditures for resolutions, section 131 mandates
closer monitoring of the capital health of insured institutions.78 It requires
supervisory agencies to take specific actions earlier than in the past, when
institutions first qualify as "significantly undercapitalized" 79 or "critically
undercapitalized."" For example, for critically undercapitalized institutions,
the FDICIA requires supervisory agencies either to appoint a receiver or
conservator within ninety days or to document why other action is more
appropriate.8 ' In addition, the FDICIA requires supervisory agencies and the
FDIC to restrict the activities of insured institutions during any period in
which they are critically undercapitalized, so that they cannot engage in
activities that historically have increased deposit insurance losses.82
Under section 131, which became effective on December 19, 1992, many
more institutions will be eligible for receivership or conservatorship than
74. FDIA § lI(c)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
75. Id. § 1821(c)(5)(D).
76. E.g., Klausner, supra note 6, at 115; Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 790 (explaining that
assets decline in value and costs of maintaining assets are high); GARTEN, supra note 6, at 9; Macey,
supra note 16.
77. E.g., Macey, supra note 16 (noting that delays disguise the health of banking industry);
Klausner, supra note 6, at 760-61 (noting that delays make ultimate resolution more costly).
78. FDICIA § 131(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1831(e) (Supp. III 1991).
79. Id. § 1831(b)(1)(D). A significantly undercapitalized depository institution is "significantly
below the required minimum level for any relevant capital measure" as specified by the primary
supervisory agency. Id.
80. Id. §§ 1831(b)(l)(E), 1831(c)(3). A "critically undercapitalized" depository institution fails to
meet any capital measure required by a primary supervisory agency, and does not possess two percent
or more tangible equity to total assets. Id. For a definition of "tangible equity," see Bacon & Lipin,
supra note 44, at A8.
81. 12 U.S.C. § 183 1(h)(3)(A).
82. Id. § 183 1(i) (prohibiting, without FDIC's prior approval, investment, expansion, acquisition,
sale of assets, extension of credit in highly leveraged transactions, material change in accounting
methods, payment of excessive compensation or bonuses, payment of above-market interest rates).
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would have been eligible previously Some commentators and regulators have
predicted that this provision will increase the number of institutions requiring
receivership or conservatorship in 1993 and 1994 far beyond recent projec-
tions. 3
Although the FDIC earmarked the cash available in the Bank Insurance
Fund to cover resolutions of banks it expected to fail in 1992, the FDIC
estimated that it would have a deficit of approximately $5.5 billion when
those resolutions become final. 84 In addition, of the 111 banks and thrifts
that were critically undercapitalized in late 1992, 80 held assets of roughly
$30 billion."5 As the round of resolutions prompted by section 131 begins,
the FDIC will continue to draw on and eventually may exhaust the $30 billion
line of credit that the Treasury may provide to the FDIC directly 86 After
that, the FDIC will have to turn to its other sources for additional fund-
ing 7-working capital loans from the Federal Financing Bank" or loans
from members of the Bank Insurance Fund. 9 Accordingly, regardless of the
number of additional insured institutions that may come under receivership or
conservatorship in the near term, it seems likely that the FDIC will require
additional funding during the resolution of the banks now targeted for closure
because they qualify as critically undercapitalized.
II. INSURANCE ASSESSMENTS
Commentators long have criticized the federal deposit insurance programs
as being underfunded and overly broad.90 Banking experts projected that the
83. See Foust, supra note 18, at 59 ("[The] FDIC estimates that Congress's 2% solution could force
regulators to shutter banks with upwards of $76 billion in assets, double what they initially expected
for 1993."); see also Knight & Schmidt, supra note I, at HI (stating that 80 banks and 31 thrifts face
certain seizure under FDICIA test; more than 1,000 institutions are on FDIC's "problem bank list").
Estimates of the number of institutions that may fail to meet capital standards have vaned significantly
over the past year, more recent projections predict a smaller number of critically undercapitalized
institutions due to general improvements in banks' profits in 1992. See Barbara A. Rehm & Claudia
Cummins, Budget Office Cuts Estimate of Price Tag for Failures, AM. BANKER, Jan. 27, 1993, at 1, 6;
Barbara A. Rehm, Bank Profits Shattered Record in '92, AM. BANKER, Mar. 10, 1993, at 1 (reporting
that 787 banks remain on "problem list" after 229 removed).
84. Knight & Schmidt, supra note 1, at H4.
85. Id.
86. FDICIA § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a) (Supp. III 1991).
87. Huber, supra note 10, at 302 (estimating $40 billion limit based on collateral held by Bank
Insurance Fund as of enactment of the FDICIA).
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1824(b). Of course, these funds represent a taxpayer bailout of the Bank Insurance
Fund because the Federal Financing Bank must borrow operating funds while it disposes of assets from
failed institutions. See Huber, supra note 10, at 302.
89. 12 U.S.C. § 1824(d).
90. E.g., Klausner, supra note 6, at 735 n.135 (regarding improper pricing of deposit insurance);




Bank Insurance Fund, for example, would become insolvent in 1992, falling
from a surplus of more than $18 billion in 1988 to a probable deficit of $5.5
billion by the close of 1992.91 Regardless of the Fund's precise financial
circumstances, the FDICIA authorized additional funding for the FDIC with
the stated goal of recapitalizing the Bank Insurance Fund. The FDICIA has
two provisions specifically designed to increase funding.
A. Increased Assessments
First, the FDICIA encourages increased assessments for deposit insurance
to make more funds available to the FDIC without requiring additional
borrowing authority or other nonassessment funding. The FDICIA directed the
FDIC to set deposit insurance assessments to recapitalize the Bank Insurance
Fund within fifteen years.92 Once the aggregate premiums reach the specified
level, the Act directs the FDIC to maintain that level.93 In addition, the Act
authorizes the FDIC to collect emergency assessments to cover amounts
borrowed from the Treasury, the Federal Financing Board, or members of the
affected insurance fund.94
Despite Congress's desire to raise more funds through deposit insurance
assessments, the FDIC has not made dramatic changes in assessments. In its
most recent assessments in September, 1992 (effective January 1, 1993), the
FDIC did not increase assessments for three-quarters of the industry and
91. Huber, supra note 10, at 301. There appears to be some dispute about the Fund's precise
financial circumstances. Compare A Stop to Go-Go Banlang, WASH. POST, July 6, 1992, at A18
(discussing how the Bank Insurance Fund lost $25 billion in four years, from an $18.3 billion balance)
and Alex Pham, White House Faulted on Bank Reform Law; GAO Chief Says Administration, Industry
Seek to Weaken Measure, WASH. POST, July 1, 1992, at FI (reporting Bank Insurance Fund deficit of
about $7 billion in 1991 following $18.3 billion balance four years earlier, the FDIC estimates that Bank
Insurance Fund will need $25.8 to $35.3 billion over next two years) and Rep. Gonzalez Accuses Bank
Regulators of Forbearance as Two Large Banks Close, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 6, 1992, at 30
(noting that Bank Insurance Fund faced $5.5 billion deficit at end of June, 1992, and is "essentially
bankrupt," and reporting that Savings Association Insurance Fund is "nearly penniless with $187 million
as of August [1992]") and Stephen Labaton, U.S. Regulators Scale Back Rise in Banking Fees, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at Al (reporting that in 1991, the FDIC estimated that failures in 1992 and 1993
would cost only $15 billion) and John M. Berry, Bank Savings Hit Record High; 1st-Quarter Profits
up 36%; Interest Rate Break Offsets Loan Losses, WASH. POST, June 11, 1992, at 10 (expecting
insurance fund with deficit of $5.5 billion to not show positive balance until well after year 2000) with
Bert Ely, There's No Need to Hike Premiums in '93, AM. BANKER, Aug. 31, 1992, at 4 (stating that
fund solvent in mid-1992).
92. FDICIA § 104(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1991) (setting assessment so that the
aggregate premiums paid reach 1.25% of total deposits at insured institutions within 15 years). The
FDICIA also authorized the FDIC to set assessments at any level necessary to reach solvency. Id. §
1817(b)(1)(A).
93. Id. § 1817(b)(1)(C); see Huber, supra note 10, at 302.
94. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(7).
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applied a smaller-than-expected increase to the remaining one-quarter. 95 The
FDIC cited improved bank profits as the primary reason for the decision.
96
As a result of this action, as of January 1, 1993, the majority of banks will
pay the same 230 for every $100 in deposits-roughly one-quarter of one
pereent9 7-- and the weakest banks will pay as much as 31¢ per $100.98
Critics assailed the FDIC's actions. Foremost among their objections was
that by not adopting higher fees, the FDIC had succumbed to political
pressures.99 In addition, commentators pointed out that the industry was not
as healthy as it might have appeared based on its then-current profitabili-
ty,"'0 because fleeting conditions, such as lower interest rates and income
from mortgage refinancings and government securities, accounted for some of
the profits.'0 ' More cynical commentators charged that the FDIC may have
postponed action against weaker banks to make the industry appear healthi-
er-a well-recognized election-year phenomenon.'0 2
While the assessment increases were projected to raise $600 million from
banks and $180 million from savings institutions,'0 3 these are not substantial
sums when viewed in context.'' 4 For example, the FDIC estimated that more
95. Labaton, supra note 91, at Al (finding nsk-based assessment only 50% of onginal proposal).
96. Id., see also Dean Foust, Banking Pulls Back from the Brink, Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1992, at 142
(attributing profits and higher stock prices to low interest rates).
97. Jerry Knight, Bank Deposit Insurance Rate Hike Reviewed; FDIC May Shift Load to Weaker
Institutions, WASH. PosT, Sept. 15, 1992, at DI.
98. See Labaton, supra note 91, at Al.
99. E.g., id. (noting that congressional members suspect administration of postponing bad news until
after presidential election); see also Stephen Labaton, Banks Aim to Block Fee Rise, N.Y. TiMEs, May
12, 1992, at DI (reporting that Congress and General Accounting Office urged increases; banks and
administration urged no increases).
100. E.g., Greising & Smith, supra note 10, at 117; Michael Quint, Why Haven't More Banks Failed,
N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 19, 1992, at DI (noting that the FDIC projected closing 200 banks with $80 billion
in assets, but it has only closed 70 banks with $20.9 billion in assets); Labaton, supra note 91, at Ai
(suggesting that surge in earnings is only temporary).
101. Quint, supra note 100.
102. Macey, supra note 16; Labaton, supra note 9 1, at AI (noting Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez's
argument that regulators who are putting off industry's troubles until after election need to shore up
insurance fund).
103. Labaton, supra note 91.
104. According to Jerome Powell, former Undersecretary for Finance in the U.S. Department of
Treasury, the FDIC had receipts of approximately $6 billion. The MacNei/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS
television broadcast, Oct. 22, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript File. In the past,
however, big bank failures have required federal assistance as high as $2.9 billion. MCorp's Regulators
Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1992, at D8 (estimating cost to FDIC of 1988 failure of First Republic
Bank Corporation of Dallas to be $2.9 billion and FDIC's cost in MCorp failure to be $2.7 billion).
Even small bank failures can require relatively high FDIC assistance. See James Grant, The Bank
Failure that Nobody Noticed, AM. BANKER, Feb. 20, 1992, at 4 (reporting that FDIC advanced $53.5
million in assistance to purchaser of failed $82.3 million Lauharach Bank of Fort Worth, Texas).
Although the number of troubled banks has declined steadily, the value of the assets they
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than 1,000 banks on the FDIC's "problem list" had assets of $610 billion at
the end of 1991.105 The late FDIC Chairman William Taylor had argued that
increases in interest rates (whenever they might occur) would enlarge the
number of "problem list" banks so that larger assessments than those actually
assessed would be necessary to provide funds for that contingency 106 Other
experts have pointed to banks' continuing problems with their real estate
portfolios that depress earnings and capital, and raise the chances of future
bank failures. 0 7 Indeed, the FDIC has estimated that the 1,000 weakest
commercial banks could cost the Bank Insurance Fund between $25 and $36
billion in the next two years.' The General Accounting Office, however,
projected in mid-1992 that the Bank Insurance Fund will use as much as $72
billion over the next four years. 0 9
B. Risk-Based Assessments
The second FDICIA provision aimed at funding encourages risk-based
assessments. Such assessments will reduce the flat-rate character of deposit
insurance premiums that less risky banks otherwise pay and also will
apportion more fairly among risk-taking institutions, their shareholders, and
depositors the risk that the FDIC will have to pay off deposits in their
institutions.' 0 Congress intended risk-based assessments to cause bank
shareholders and depositors to monitor the risks that their respective
depository institutions present to the deposit insurance fund."' Despite the
FDICIA's mandate for higher, risk-based premiums, the FDIC adopted an
assessment one-half as large as originally proposed." 2
hold-estimated at more than $600 billion-is at a record level. See Labaton, supra note 91, at C2.
Thus, the FDIC's receipts may be insufficient for the assets held by failing institutions.
105. Quint, supra note 100, at DI (citing experts who believe that $610 billion figure-up from $487
billion three months earlier-must include assets of one or more major banks).
106. Id.
107. E.g., Greising & Smith, supra note 10, at 116; Foust, supra note 96, at 143 (noting that experts
cite slower economy, higher interest rates, and deeper discounts in real estate as threats to banks, and
want 18 additional months of low rates to restore health).
108. A Stop to Go-Go Banking, supra note 91.
109. Id. Large bank bailouts can use huge sums; for example, at one point dunng the early phase
of the Continental bailout, Continental used $13.7 billion of capital provided or arranged by the FDIC.
SPRAGUE, supra note 6, at 9.
110. See Klausner, supra note 6, at 710.
111. Id. at 711-13 (describing "moral hazard" present in all insurance schemes with flat-rate fees);
see also Stephen Labaton, FDIC Postpones Increase for Deposit Insurance Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
1992, at Di (noting that current flat-rate system disadvantages well-managed institutions).
112. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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Commentators argue that the FDICIA's basis for setting risk-based
assessments-capital adequacy-is flawed because the capital ratios that serve
as the criterion are crude measures of the risks actually presented by
institutions.' 3 Instead, banking experts favor market-based measures of
risks," 4 including reinsurance' 5 or coinsurance." 6 Congress has directed
the FDIC to conduct two studies that pertain to the future shape of deposit
insurance; one study concerns the feasibility of reinsurance and the other the
feasibility of offering both insured and uninsured deposit accounts ."
7
Whether one views the experts' predictions of bank failure rates as unduly
rosy or gloomy, and the method of determining the need for increases as
useful or flawed, the FDIC's actions demonstrate familiar problems with the
deposit insurance system-underfunding and intense political pressures. If the
FDIC has estimated incorrectly the near-term incidence of failures or the
potential costs of those failures, it will be faced with the need to draw upon
the lines of credit authorized by the FDICIA (for example, loans from the
Treasury, Federal Financing Bank, or Bank Insurance Fund members) or to
ask Congress for additional funding in the event of a sizeable shortfall.
Regrettably, it appears that the FDICIA will be only a stopgap financing
measure and further adjustments in the deposit insurance system are
likely 118
III. THE FDICIA's UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
PARAMETERS FOR FUTURE ACTION
It is hard to predict what the next few years will bring for the banking
industry Certain factors-many of which have been apparent for some
years-will shape the future debate about the banking industry and its
113. Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 801.
114. 137 CONG. REc. S 1160-70 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dixon) (discussing the
Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 1991, S. 261, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., which did not become law).
115. See Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 801-02.
116. Id. at 801-02 n.65 (citing Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance-The Appropriate Roles for State
and Federal Governments, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 27, 35 (1987)); see also S. 261, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
117. FDICIA §§ 321-322, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. III 1991). For the fiill texts of these provisions,
see Federal Banking Insurance Reform, supra note 15, at In 2221-2222. The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System released its report on December 19, 1992. 50 Fed. Reg. 3019 (Jan. 7, 1993).
118. In light of the banking industry's current efforts to repeal some of the FDICIA's provisions, it
is likely that Congress will consider further banking reforms. See A Stop to Go-Go Banking, supra note




regulation. These factors include the structural reforms not adopted in the
FDICIA." 9
There are at least four distinct factors that will shape the debate. First, the
market for traditional commercial banking services has been shrinking over
the last decade. 20 This shrinkage is attributable in part to the limits on the
products and services that FDIC-insured banks and thrifts are legally allowed
to offer their customers.' 2 ' These limits enable non-bank financial services
providers to encroach upon service lines formerly offered by financial
institutions, thus limiting the banks' profit-making opportunities. Shrinking
opportunities also have roots in technological advances that make financial
services as available as the closest automated teller machine or telephone.
Second, foreign competition for banking business has intensified. This
competition includes offshore netting of dollar-denominated transactions
2 2
and the influence of Japanese and European banks that offer customers a
wider range of services than their U.S. counterparts.
123
Third, major financial institutions are consolidating rapidly Recent
acquisitions by many of the largest U.S. bank holding companies and by
regional bank holding companies, such as BancOne, 124  First Union
119. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. This discussion does not reach the current state
banrers to nationwide banking and diversification, which many commentators agree should be relaxed,
repealed, or preempted. E.g., Byrne & Coulter, supra note 10, at 681-94; Macey & Miller, supra note
30, at 769.
120. See GARTEN, supra note 6, at 154-56. Professor Garten argues that shrinkage is inevitable, and
she expresses concern that the FDICIA will interfere with appropriate shrinkage to the extent that the
FDIC and other bank regulators pursue a goal of profitability for financial institutions-a goal that in
her view is obtainable only in a highly protected environment such as our current bank regulatory
scheme. Id., see also Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 781; cf Klausner, supra note 6, at 728-29.
121. See MODERNIZNG THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 22, at 54-55; cf. Klausner, supra note
6, at 728-29.
122. See Federal Reserve Board Interim Policy Statement on Offshore Netting and Clearing
Arrangements, 54 Fed. Reg. 26,092 (June 21, 1989). In addition, foreign banks have developed
alternatives to the major funds transfer systems operated by the Federal Reserve System (Fedwire) and
the Clearinghouse of New York Banks (C.H.I.P.S.). Sarah Jane Hughes, Policing Money Laundenng
Through Funds Transfers: A Critique of Regulation Under the Bank Secrecy Act, 67 IND. L.J. 283, 313
nn. 179-81 (1992).
123. The U.S. banking system more strictly separates banking and commerce than other leading
banking systems. Consequently, U.S. banks-as opposed to non-bank subsidiaries of bank holding
companies-may not participate in investment banking. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); J.P Morgan & Co. Inc., The Chase Manhattan
Corp., Bankers Trust New York Corp., Citicorp, and Security Pacific Corp., 75 FED. RESERVE BULL.
192 (1989) [hereinafter ,.P Morgan & Co.] (authorizing non-bank subsidianes of bank holding
companies to offer corporate equity and debt underwriting services).
124. BancOne was the twelfth largest holding company in the United States as of December 31,
1991. Top 100 U.S. Bank Holding Companies, AM. BANKER, Apr. 16, 1992, at 10. On April 13, 1992,
it agreed to acquire Valley National Corp., a Phoenix, Arizona, bank holding company that was ranked
52nd largest asof December 31, 1991. Id. atl 1.
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Corp.,' and KeyCorp., 2 6 provide ample evidence of consolidation. Con-
solidation signals the emergence of giant, more diversified financial institution
networks. 27 It also evidences a pattern of the 1960s through the 1980s when
federal and state bank regulatory agencies, as opposed to Congress, made
most of the industry's structural reforms. For example, federal regulators
approved expanded bank products, 28 and states removed or reduced barriers
to acquisitions by out-of-state banks.'29
On the other side of the geographic and product diversification issue,
communities have expressed their concerns that consolidations would decrease
local services, particularly services necessary to fund entrepreneurship andjob
creation. 30 Some experts predict that banking will split into two
camps-one that competes with investment bankers and international banks
to serve major commercial clients but does not have deposit insurance for
most of its activities, and the other that serves local clients and that has
deposit insurance for most deposits.' 3 '
The fourth factor relates to the spillover from the thrift crisis, particularly
the backlog of assets of thrifts and banks that failed in the 1980s and 1990s.
Banking experts generally agree that these assets, including banking facilities,
loan portfolios, and property that served as collateral, not only drag down the
125. First Union ranked 13th among holding companies. Id. at 10. In 1992, it agreed to acquire
Dominion Bankshares Corp., Roanoke, Virginia. See Dominion Bankshares Earnings Declined 48% in
Third Quarter; Loyola Capital, Ameribanc Report Higher Profits, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1992, at G3.
126. KeyCorp. was ranked 28th largest pror to its agreements to acquire Puget Sound Bancorp., a
Tacoma, Washington, company ranked 94th, and 48 branches of the former Security Pacific Bank
located in Washington State from BankAmerica Corp. Top 100 US. Bank Holding Companies, supra
note 124.
127. See GARTEN, supra note 6, at 155; Jerry Knight, Mega-Merger Creates 11-State NationsBank;
Chemical, Manufacturers Also Combime, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1992, at D9.
128. See GARTEN, supra note 6, at 134-36.
129. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-552 to 36-563 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 5, §§
801-807 (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE § 524.1805 (1983); MASS. LAwS ANN., ch. 167(A), § 2 (Law. Co-
op. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.230 (1983).
130. E.g., Capital Crunch Holds Small Business Lending at Bay, HOUSTON BuS. J., Mar. 16, 1992,
§ I, at 29; Knight, supra note 127, at D9 (citing bank owner Joseph L. Allbritton's statement that banks
based out of town are "bad for community").
13 i. Paul S. Nadler, Fast Forward to the Year 2000, AM. BANKER, July 27, 1992, at 4. The FDICIA
may assist in this separation in two ways. First, it offers financial institutions credits against deposit
insurance assessments for the provision of community services. FDICIA §§ 232-234, 12 U.S.C. §§
1834a, 1834b (Supp. III 1991); Federal Banking Insurance Reform, supra note 15, at 2131-2134.
During his election campaign, President Clinton proposed a more extensive plan for community-oriented
banks that would increase the assistance available from the banking industry and the federal government.
Campaign '92-Clinton Pledges Rewrite of CRA, Network of Community Banks, BNA BANKING DAILY,
Sept. 21, 1992.
In addition, Congress directed the FDIC to study a "two-window" deposit system-with one window
for insured deposits and another for non-insured deposits. FDICIA §§ 321-322, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp.
III 1991); Federal Banking Insurance Reform, supra note 15, at % 2221-2222.
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value of other bank properties and assets, 3 2 but also erode other profits as
banks establish huge reserves for losses. 3 3 The availability of these assets
and the FDICIA's potentially stricter "least possible cost" test depress the
current values of bank and thrift franchises 134 and, accordingly, decrease the
amounts that potential purchasers of failed banks will be ready to invest to
purchase them.
3 1
The FDICIA reflects a caretaker's staid mentality rather than a reformer's
zeal: it preserves the fundamental character of the deposit insurance system
while augmenting the regulatory structure designed to limit risks to the
system. 36 Despite its attempted reforms of FDIC policies that have been
criticized in recent years, the FDICIA and the FDIC's actions since its
enactment offer fresh evidence of how difficult it is to restructure the banking
industry through legislative action. 37 We have little reason to expect that
Congress will adopt real reforms when it next recapitalizes the deposit
insurance funds-an event the FDIC's current approaches to institutions'
failures makes very likely
In adopting the FDICIA, Congress did not enact structural reforms for the
banking industry, such as the repeal of the Banking Act of 1933, the
McFadden Act, and the Douglas Amendment. It also left deposit insurance
coverage substantially unchanged. Congress must correct these deficiencies in
the near term or be prepared to provide additional funding for resolutions of
failed institutions. It also must expect that these resolutions will be very
costly
As Congress increases oversight and regulatory supervision of insured
depository institutions and as institutions feel the pressures of increasing
deposit insurance assessments, experts expect that some major financial
institutions with more diversified business 138 may relinquish their federal
132. See Greising & Smith, supra note 10, at 116.
133. Id. at 116-17.
134. E.g., Rehm, supra note 57, at 1.
135. E.g., id., Phil Roosevelt & Barbara A. Rehm, CrossLand Seized as Regulations Reject Bids, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 27, 1992, at 1.
136. See FDICIA §§ 112, 132, 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b) (Supp. III 1991). These provisions call for
annual examinations by bank regulatory agencies and audits of the financial condition of the financial
institution.
137. See GARTEN, supra note 6, at 64-66 (noting that legislative restructunng is rare in banking
industry). Indeed, banking, like other matters regulated at the federal level, appears to be affected by
"demosclerosis," a phenomenon by which interest groups preserve the status quo by making it too
difficult to make major changes. See Rauch, supra note 4, at 1998, 2000 (describing the difficulty of
changing regulation of banking and deposit insurance).
138. This category could include banks, such as Bankers Trust, that now pursue less traditional, less
deposit-onented strategies, such as corporate equity and debt underwriting through affiliates in the
holding company. See J.P Morgan & Co., supra note 123.
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banking charters 139 so that they may compete for the more profitable
commercial and international banking business and to avoid the burden of
deposit insurance assessments. Their departure from the body of banks paying
deposit insurance assessments will place more pressures on the funding of
deposit insurance and finally may prompt Congress to undertake a more
thorough reform of the banking and deposit insurance systems.
AUTHOR'S EPILOGUE
This Essay was based primarily on research covering the period from
January through October, 1992. Since I completed this Essay in October,
1992, the general banking environment in the United States has improved,'40
but not sufficiently to conclude that the banking system has conquered the
problems of the 1980s and early 1990s.14' For example, on October 30,
1992, the FDIC declared insolvent a number of banks, including twenty
owned by First City Bancorporation of Texas.'42
For all of 1992, the FDIC closed 120 insured banks. 143 The December 19,
1992, effective date of section 141 of the FDICIA, which requires prompt
action against undercapitalized banks, was not the "December surprise"
predicted by banking experts.' 4 4 Favorable interest rates allowed many banks
to report improved profits for 1992.141
139. See Nadler, supra note 131, at 4; Core Banks, supra note 70, at 190-92.
140. See Rehm & Cummins, supra note 83, at 1; FDIC Office Reiterates that There Will Be No
December Surprise of Bank Failures, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 3, 1992, at 1.
141. See OTS May Close 81 More Thrifts by August 1993, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 14, 1992;
FDIC Has 35 U.S. Banks with $7 BLNAssets in Danger, RELTER MONEY REp., Dec. 2, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Banking Library, Monrpt File; cf Rehm, supra note 83, at I (quoting acting FDIC Chairman
Andrew C. Hove's prediction that the industry was "off the critical list").
142. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Closes First City Bancorp., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1992, at 37. The
FDIC operated the group until their sale in late January, 1993, to Chemical Banking Corporation's Texas
Commerce Bankshares and to 15 other banks or bank holding corporations. Kenneth H. Bacon &
Michael Allan, FDIC Selling Assets of First City Bancorp., WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993, at A3. The
FDIC had rescued the First City banks in 1988 with a $970 million capital infusion. Harlan, supra note
53, at A3. The premiums paid for the individual banks in late 1992 surprised the FDIC and banking
experts in part because of the FDIC's projections at the time of the October, 1992, insolvency
declarations that it would lose an additional $500 million on the First City banks. Id.
143. Bill Atkinson, Bitter Requiem for a Small-Town Bank, AM. BANKER, Feb. 2, 1993, at I, I.
144. Barbara A. Rehm, Just 20 Banks Seen Failing Under Dec. 19 Rule Change, AM. BANKER, Dec.
3, 1992, at I.
145. See Rehm & Cummins, supra note 83, at 6; Steve Klinkerman, Banking Recovery Strong but
Erratic, AM. BANKER, Sept. 16, 1992, at 1.
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Other banks, particularly those in California and the Atlantic and New
England states, continued to suffer from nonperforming real estate loan
assets. 14 6 One out of five savings banks remained on the FDIC's "problem
list" at year's end. 147 Banks in areas other than those named above remain
susceptible to regional recession and to reduced profitability, particularly if
the Federal Reserve System were to relax its low-interest-rate policy 141
Regardless of their insolvency just three months earlier, in late January,
1993, the FDIC sold the First City banks for a substantial premium-in
marked contrast to both initial expectations and prices prevailing over the past
two years. 149 In addition, it began to market CrossLand Federal Savings
Bank, a New York institution' 5 that it placed in conservatorship in late
January, 1992, with the announced intention of waiting as many as three years
before offering it for sale."5 '
Despite the more favorable aspects of these developments (no "December
surprise," higher profits, and the premium paid for First City's banks), I stand
by my assessments of the FDICIA of 1991 and, in particular, of the state of
our deposit insurance system.
146. Calvin Sims, Bad Tidings for California Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at Di (reporting
that regulators predict 30 fewer banks in California may fail in 1993); Determination of Economically
Depressed Regions, 57 Fed. Reg. 60,140 (Dec. 18, 1992) (discussing proposed rule to revise the
designation of economically depressed areas in which Savings Association Insurance Fund members may
receive direct FDIC assistance; revised rule would drop Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas, and add California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont).
147. FDIC Tallies up a Record Quarter, AM. BANKER, Dec. 24, 1992, at 7, 10 (reporting one in five
savings banks are on "problem list").
148. Susan Schmidt, Thrift Supervision Chief to Depart Next Month, WASH. PosT, Nov. 9, 1992, at
A19; Steve Klinkerman, Some Banks Seen Vulnerable to Rate Spikes, AM. BANKER, Dec. 22, 1992, at
1.
149. Bacon & Allan, supra note 142, at A3.
150. See supra note 57.
151. See supra notes 43-44.
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